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NOTE
Poverty and Patents: Intellectual Property Policy and Economic
Inequality
Wenkai Tzeng*
INTRODUCTION
The America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA) transitioned America’s patenting
system away from a first-to-invent system to a first-to-file system.1 A consequence of
this change is that economically disadvantaged inventors that are under-resourced
may be priced out of the costly patenting process and unable to protect their
intellectual property. One might view this as a loss of constitutionally granted rights.
In an effort to mitigate this problem, Congress incorporated a number of provisions
including section 32 into the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act to aid individual
inventors and smaller entities by encouraging patent pro bono prosecution by
practitioners. 2 There are two important questions raised by the AIA: (1) how
pronounced has the loss of protection been to this class of inventors that in the past
relied on automatic protection, and (2) how effective is section 32 and the other
accommodations included in the AIA in protecting inventors that had previously
relied on automatic protection under the first-to-invent system. This Note will
highlight the reasons for studying this issue and the problems with switching to a
first-to-file system, develop an approach for further research, and recommend
methods for encouraging innovation from under-resourced inventors to combat
increasing inequality.
I.

IN PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC EQUALITY

Examining the impact of intellectual property policy on American society is
key to understanding the nature and causes of economic inequality. Inequality has
expanded significantly over the years and the gap between the wealthy and the poor
has continued to widen. Inequality of this nature is a problem for society. Social
mobility is frustrated when capital and the means of production are concentrated in
a few members of society.3 Those with the least amount of resources tend to have
*
1

2
3

Notes Editor, Indiana Journal of Law & Social Equality; J.D. Candidate 2017, Indiana University
Maurer School of Law.
A first-to-invent system effectively grants inventors automatic protection and monopoly rights for their
inventions while a first-to-file system requires inventors to apply for patent protection through the
United States Patent Office. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, sec. 3, § 102,
125 Stat. 284, 285–86 (2011).
Id. at 340.
See generally Roy van der Weide & Branko Milanovic, Inequality Is Bad for Growth of the Poor (but Not
for That of the Rich) (World Bank Grp., Working Paper No. 6963, 2014),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/888731468331207447/pdf/WPS6963.pdf.
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higher costs of living. 4 The financial cost-of-living constraint prevents access to
important resources such as education and healthcare. The social barriers the poor
face result in a drag on the growth of labor productivity and ultimately the national
standard of living. Without remedy, the burdens of poverty function as a social trap
and will span generations, slowing the rate of societal growth. 5 An intellectual
property policy regime granting monopoly rights to a select few leads to a high
concentration of capital in the hands of a few inventors. Understanding the impact of
intellectual property policy allows for appropriate reformation of the system to
maximize the economic benefits of innovation for all of society but requires balancing
individual fairness with optimal social benefit.
The history of intellectual property rights in the United States places the
current policy in context. Intellectual property policy in the United States began with
the framers of the Constitution. Following a legacy of protecting inventors in Europe,
the framers incorporated an important provision authorizing and requiring Congress
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.” 6 Congress acted by establishing a patent system, among other
protections, designed to protect the “heroic inventor.” 7 The individual “garage
inventor” has since become an American icon promulgating the idea of the American
dream that anyone, no matter what background, can become successful through
ingenuity and perseverance. 8 The patent system, managed by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), is an integral part the American dream and
enables the government to carry out the objective of protecting innovation and
individual entrepreneurial activity in the United States.9
Fairness and equality are the foundation of American culture, and the courts
have reiterated this underlying principle.10 The patent system, however, can at times
present a difficult juxtaposition that requires a careful balancing act between various
opposing views. On the one hand, there are concerns such as providing fair means for
anyone to protect their intellectual property. This objective must be aligned with the
incentivizing of innovation for economic growth. The combination of these two goals
must also not lead to social ills and economic disparities. Sometimes these objectives
manifest themselves as competing goals. The fees for applying for a patent can price

4
5
6
7
8
9
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Derek Thompson, Total Inequality, ATLANTIC, (Apr. 1, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/total-inequality/476238/?utm_source=SFFB.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 900, 909–14 (2002).
David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The America Invents Act and Individual
Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 518 (2013).
See Partnership for American Innovation, Patents Fuel the American Dream, YOUTUBE (July 19, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1VTOXCOaSF4; see also Daniel A. Tagliente, Shooting Blanks: The
Ineffectiveness of the Executive Branch’s Entrance into the Great Patent Troll Hunt, 45 SETON HALL L.
REV. 311, 312 (2015).
See Janis, supra note 7, at 913 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234
F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S. 915 (2001)).
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out many poorer inventors with marketable inventions. Granting monopoly rights to
parties with wide economic disparities raises concerns of fairness.
There are competing views on intellectual property policies. Traditional views
in favor of the patent system typically present multiple rationales. 11 The
“instrumental” view centers on real world benefits.12 This economic, utilitarian-based
theory focuses on maximizing happiness of society at large as opposed to the
individual inventor. 13 Granting inventors monopoly rights for a period of time
benefits society by encouraging inventors to devote resources to developing novel and
useful technologies. Other arguments in favor of a patent system involve disclosing
knowledge to the public and rewarding inventors.14 The public disclosure function is
thought to help advance technological innovation by teaching others new ideas.
Invention and innovation would, in theory, add upon one another resulting in an
evolution of technological development.
The key to balancing technological advancement with minimal social harms is
creating a publication system and a set of rules that the average inventor can follow
without having to resort to financing the exorbitant legal costs required. Historically,
these “economic freedoms,” as economist and author Edmund Phelps puts it, “were of
key importance in enabling processes of innovation.”15 Phelps contends that “patents
were the key—the open sesame—to innovation in the nineteenth century.”16 Building
on the past successes of intellectual property protection systems therefore presents a
sound and logical path for public policy to follow.
Some modern day proponents of the current intellectual property policy regime
laud the benefits of the system, in some cases, controversially. On the other hand,
some argue that economic inequality is a good thing, and to eliminate the ensuing
inequality that comes from innovation and technological development (that some
argue that result from patent systems) would necessarily mean eliminating one of
the major driving forces of innovation in the modern economy—the startup.17 While
reactions to the idea that monopoly rights for intellectual property are controversial,
there is some plausibility to the notion that measures taken to prevent the inevitable
economic gap from forming would also necessarily eliminate incentives to invent.
Creating disincentives for devoting resources to invention could deter inventors from
contributing to the economy and growing and expanding economic wealth, even if for
a limited group of people. Economic growth, even if initially formed in a small subset
of the population, eventually ripples outwards to the rest of society.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Jonathan Porat, SMALL BUS. OFF. OF ADVOC., Patenting and Innovative Startups: Putting the America
Invents Act in a Broader Economic Context 2 (June 25,
2015), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/Issue-Brief-9-AIA-Patents-Small-Biz.pdf.
ROGER SCHECHTER & JOHN THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 9 (2007).
JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 32–35 (4th ed. 2012).
Id.
EDMUND PHELPS, MASS FLOURISHING: HOW GRASSROOTS INNOVATION CREATED JOBS, CHALLENGE, AND
CHANGE 81 (2013).
Id. at 85.
Paul Graham, Economic Inequality, PAUL GRAHAM (Jan. 2016), http://paulgraham.com/ineq.html.
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On the opposite end of the spectrum, there are theories that inequality
stemming from the patent system is considered “morally repugnant.” 18 From one
perspective, it is thought that “intellectual property regimes that create monopoly
rents that impede access . . . create inequality and hamper growth more generally”
and that superior methods, such as government grants, foundations, and prize
systems for discovery, that do not exhibit “the inequality-increasing disadvantages of
the current intellectual property rights system” are viable alternatives.19 There is
some support for these ideas, and in light of alternatives, perpetuating an unfair
system that also inhibits innovation and economic growth is questionable.
Intellectual property policy considered in this light suggests that the existing system
institutes widespread and harmful repercussions on society. There have been several
studies that have examined the problem of innovation leading to greater inequality.
The rapid increase of economic inequality worldwide over the past decade has
led to significant research into the nature and causes of this growing problem. Some
studies suggest that the disparity is partly attributable to the patent system and
other intellectual property policies.20 Researchers conclude that “the top 1% income
share in a given US state in a given year, was positively and significantly correlated
with the state’s degree of innovativeness,” 21 and that there is a “causal effect of
innovation-led growth on top incomes.”22 In a recent study, researchers examining
labor share decline determined that the deterioration of the portion of wages paid to
workers in national income, commonly referred to as the labor share of income, can
be entirely explained by the rise in use of intellectual property products.23 The effects
of a breakdown in the equal distribution of the benefits of innovation can be both
profound and apparent. For example, historically the largest companies by capital
assets also employed the most people, but increased productivity as a result of
incorporation of new technologies has changed the landscape. 24 By the t century,
companies with the greatest capital assets—measured by market capitalization—
employ significantly fewer people, and most are technology-related firms.25
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25

Joseph E. Stiglitz, Opinion, How Intellectual Property Reinforces Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2013,
9:04 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/how-intellectual-property-reinforcesinequality/.
Id.
Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, Antonin Bergeaud, Richard Blundell & David Hémous, Innovation and
Top Income Inequality 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21247, 2015); see ESTELLE
SOMMEILLER & MARK PRICE, THE INCREASINGLY UNEQUAL STATES OF AMERICA: INCOME INEQUALITY BY
STATE, 1917 TO 2012, 3 (2015),
http://www.epi.org/files/2014/IncreasinglyUnequalStatesofAmerica1917to2012.pdf.
Aghion et al., supra note 20, at 3.
Id.
Dongya Koh, Raül Santaeulàlia-Llopis, & Yu Zheng, Labor Share Decline and the Capitalization of
Intellectual Property Products, (Feb. 29, 2016), http://r-santaeulalia.net/pdfs/IPP-and-USLaborShareshort.pdf.
Paul Krugman, Opinion, Is Vast Inequality Necessary?, The Opinion Pages, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/opinion/is-vast-inequality-necessary.html.
Gillian B. White, The Age of the Ghost Company, ATLANTIC (Jan. 7, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/01/the-age-of-the-ghost-company/423138/ (citing
Jerry Davis, Capital Markets and Job Creation in the 21st Century, CTR. EFFECTIVE PUB. MGMT.
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The bottom line is that technological advancements have increased
productivity so much that far fewer people are needed to maintain such businesses.
The level of labor productivity in society is sometimes thought to be incongruous to
profits of the businesses that benefit from it. Once achieving a level of capital size,
these companies can then leverage their assets toward research and development,
unlike smaller entrepreneurs, leaving those without sufficient resources behind.
Advancement in technology and the intellectual property rights that protect them
create systemic social problems.
Beyond just pricing out poorer inventors from participating in technological
advancement, a decline in labor share of income worsens inequality and leads to a
corresponding decline in consumption among consumers. 26 As the owners of
intellectual property corner the market on their revenue streams, their consumption
habits largely do not maintain the same pace as their wealth status. The implications
are far-reaching and widespread throughout the economy. While some argue that
inequality is required for continued economic prosperity, the counter-argument that
new business formation and the startup culture are only a minor driving force of
economic inequality is plausible. Regardless of where the disparity is coming from,
there exists a strong correlation between new technological developments, startup or
not, and it will lead to wealth gaps. Rising income inequality remains “a significant
barrier to economic growth and full employment.”27 Despite this connection, relating
these issues to real world effects is notoriously difficult. Intellectual property largely
remains a subject confined to a tiny segment of the population, usually inventors.
Unlike other hotbed issues such as poverty or civil rights, anecdotes of struggling
inventors rarely get the spotlight of societal attention, particularly in light of the
macro-economic perspective of ongoing research. Finding struggling entrepreneurial
inventors outside of corporate research and development centers can be challenging,
especially if their economic circumstances are constrained. Despite the paucity of
information over the specific sources of a widening wealth gap, it is clear that the
trend of continuing imbalance remains a problem.
The problems of economic inequality caused by innovation are not limited to
the United States. In a study focusing on urban and rural income disparities in China,
researchers found that large amounts of innovation could worsen inequality in any
country. 28 The demographics of inventors alone indicate substantial economic
disparities. For example, like China, the United States also exhibits an imbalance of
inventors in metropolitan areas with some eighty percent of inventors living in cities

26
27
28

BROOKINGS (Dec. 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/12/30-21stcentury-job-creation-davis/capital_markets.pdf).
Bruce Bartlett, National Income: Paying Work, Not Capital, 29 DEMOCRACY (Summer 2013),
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/29/national-income-paying-work-not-capital/.
Jim Tankersley, A Big-Shot Venture Capitalist Says We Need Inequality. What Do Economists Say?,
WASHINGTON POST:WONKBLOB (Jan. 14, 2016) (referencing Barry Z. Cynamon & Steven M. Fazzari,
Inequality, the Great Recession and the Slow Recovery, 40 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 373 (2015)).
See Qingchun Liu & C.-Y. Cynthia Lin Lawell, The Effects of Innovation on Income Inequality in China,
U.C. DAVIS (Oct. 2015), http://www.des.ucdavis.edu/faculty/Lin/China_innovation_inequality_paper.pdf.
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since 1976 and eighty-two percent since 2005. 29 Sophisticated inventors are more
likely to have access to resources in urban areas, and as success catapults urban
inventors to higher wealth, disparities between the economically constrained living
in rural areas widens.
Narrowing the issue to intellectual property policy, the research on the impact
of innovation policies on income inequality indicates that stronger patent protections
lead to greater increases in income inequality. 30 Research suggests that policy
decisions have contributed to the recent trend of inequality in the United States.31
The pre-AIA era of first-to-invent system is generally more conducive to innovation
than first-to-file.32 The idea that first-to-invent systems are better is supported by
studies of Canada’s recent switch in 1989.33 The opportunity to discover insight into
similar problems of intellectual property policies leading to inequality elsewhere
around the world should not be ignored.
Academics from other fields have also weighed in on the dubiousness of the
patent system. The ethical considerations of patent systems dispose of many of the
traditional theories supporting patent and other intellectual property protection
systems.34 The research conducted in this area lends credence to the argument that
innovation should be encouraged among low-income inventors and that the current
intellectual property protection systems designed to stimulate innovation are largely
leaving the small inventor behind. Abandoning the garage inventor in favor of megacorporate research and development is unquestionably immoral.
While the debate over economic inequality rages on, within the context of
intellectual policy there are very clear concerns that have been considered by
legislatures. The AIA was designed to bring the United States into harmony with the
international community. 35 This meant converting the United States patent law
system from first-to-invent to the international community’s first-to-file system. The
changes included a number of provisions designed to accommodate small inventors,
such as updating the definition of prior art, adjusting joinder requirements,
introducing new inter parte proceedings, and reducing fees for a new class of inventors

29

30
31
32
33
34
35

JONATHAN ROTHWELL, JOSÉ LOBO, DEBORAH STRUMSKY & MARK MURO, METRO. POLICY PROGRAM AT
BROOKINGS, PATENTING PROSPERITY: INVENTION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND
ITS METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1, 12 (2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/02/patentingprosperity-rothwell.
Angus C. Chu, Effects of Patent Policy on Income and Consumption Inequality in a R&D Growth Model,
77 S. ECON. J. 336, 337 (2010).
Id. at 338.
Kaz Miyagiwa, The 2011 America Invents Act: Does it Undermine Innovation?, 24 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 211, 212 (2015).
Id.
See generally, Sigrid Sterckx, The Moral Justifiability of Patents, 13 J. EUR. ETHICS NETWORK 249
(2006) (arguing that the traditional theories of natural rights, distributive justice, and consequentialist
views are all flawed).
Eric P. Vandenburg, America Invents Act: How it Affects Small Businesses, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 201, 207
(2013); Melissa Cerro, Navigating a Post America Invents Act World: How the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act Supports Small Businesses, 34 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 193, 202 (2014).

2017]

Poverty and Patents

319

called “micro entities.”36 Legislative considerations included a variety of concerns for
under-resourced inventors, but the full impact of the changes outlined may not have
been clearly understood.
Examining the congressional reasons for establishing mechanisms to
accommodate the under-resourced inventor in the AIA may shed light on how
significant the issue of inequality was for legislatures. Advocates and detractors have
expressed a variety of concerns that are captured in the legislative history of the AIA.
For example, discussion over the need for the provisional patent system found
support by a legislator who argued that “[a] move to first-to-file system, which is what
this bill would do, without a corresponding 1-year grace period in other countries
dramatically undermines the patent protection of American inventors.” 37 A
provisional patent allows inventors to protect their ideas for a year without fully
disclosing the details of their invention. This allows for further development without
risk of losing out on protection. Other legislators argued that there were sufficient
safeguards built into the legislation, such as supplemental examination and
potentially reduced litigation.38 Opponents posited the important notion that “small
inventors—the backbone of the American spirit of innovation—who do not have the
funding or the legal staff to race to the PTO to file a patent will without question lose
inventions to well-funded and well-staffed corporations.”39 Furthermore, in debate it
was suggested the AIA violated the constitutional provision granting Congress the
authority to establish a patent system as a strategy for defeating the Bill.40 In the
end, however, the AIA survived the attack and failed to garner additional support for
smaller inventors.
Congressional discussion in support of the small inventor appears to revolve
around a variety of mechanisms designed to protect the small inventor, such as a
special classification called the micro-entity status, which allowed reduced fees, 41
provisional applications 42 granting a year of additional protection before fully
publishing the invention, and data collection for a Small Business Administration
(SBA) study.43 There remained, however, little discussion about the patent pro bono
program in the record. 44 The provision directing the USPTO to coordinate efforts
among law associations across the country to establish the pro bono program “to
36

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Cerro, supra note 35, at 196; see also Donald S. Chisum, America Invents Act of 2011: Analysis and
Cross-References, CHISUM.COM (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.chisum.com/wpcontent/uploads/AIAOverview.pdf; Sasha Rao & Daniel Keese, Aftershocks from the AIA: A Seismic
Shift in Patent Law?, LAW360 (Mar. 26, 2012, 1:02 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/317549/aftershocks-from-the-aia-a-seismic-shift-in-patent-law.
157 CONG. REC. H4480, 4482 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J.
435, 445–51 (2012).
157 CONG. REC. E1191-03 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. West).
Id.
Matal, supra note 38, at 495.
Id. at 455–56.
156 CONG. REC. S1312, 1313 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2010) (statement of Sen. Landrieu).
See Matal, supra note 38, at 499; see generally PATRICK A. DOODY, COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT (2012).
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assist financially under-resourced independent inventors and small businesses”
appears as merely a footnote in the law.45 Yet the potential for the patent pro bono
program could be substantial if given sufficient support and funding. The legislative
concern over the problems exacerbated by the intellectual property regime has been
nearly silent. As the income gap widens, moves to improve intellectual property
policy, such as the the pro bono program, has failed to significant garner support.
The variety of perspectives present in the ongoing intellectual discourse raises
concerns over whether inventors with limited resources are being “encouraged to
promote the progress of science and useful arts” or if Congress has unconstitutionally
limited this clause to only well-funded entities. Creating a system that only wealthy
inventors can access is inherently an unfair system. Closing off invention to smaller
entities and entrepreneurs also means eliminating a significant source of potential
economic growth, technological innovation, and social progress. Addressing the issue
of inequality is of paramount importance for multiple reasons and has widespread
implications for the economy, social justice, and constitutional legal theory. Ensuring
rigorous investigation into these questions will allow legislators to enact laws from a
well-informed standpoint and lead social, cultural, and economic development toward
an equitable and productive future. Although the AIA only took effect on March 16,
2013, 46 a number of researchers have already begun exploring its effects. The
following discussion examines research conducted by scholars and recommends a
variety of continuing efforts to steer society toward an intellectual property regime
that is equally accessible to every creative effort regardless of economic status or level
of wealth.
II.

RESEARCHING POLICY DECISIONS

Determining if intellectual property policy such as the AIA will lead to more
inequality and if the tacked on remedies provided are effective in providing equal
opportunities for everyone is critical to proper evolution of intellectual property
policy. There are a number of notable works that provide comprehensive surveys of
literature and legal thought on the considerations of the impact of the AIA, though
the field of economics has largely left the impact of the AIA to legal scholars to
examine. The impact of the AIA on small businesses and inventors suggests that
there are many possible problems that inventors will face, including issues largely
related to companies with greater capital and legal resources holding significant
patenting advantages over smaller inventors.47 Closer examination of the complex
proceedings and new fee structure also has some impact on intellectual property
policy.48
It is estimated that “minor provisions of the AIA targeted at helping small
businesses and micro entities are overcome by the indirect harm done to them by

45
46
47
48

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 32(a), 125 Stat. 284, 340 (2011).
See id. at 293.
Cerro, supra note 35, at 223.
Id.
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other general provisions targeted at all patentees.”49 The research goes on to suggest
that damage caused by the AIA will affect the entire patent system by discouraging
public disclosure via the patent system and by increasing the patent backlog.50 Even
before the AIA was enacted, small entities faced significant hurdles, some of which
extend beyond just the process of filing a patent.51 Litigation involving infringement
post-AIA still represents a costly battle for patentees. Non-practicing entities have
all but openly abused the poor inventor over the high cost of defending against
accusations of infringement.52 For the moment, the jury is still out on the impact to
small inventors of post-grant reviews.53 Some legal theories suggest that there are
some unstated benefits to the AIA that go beyond just the minor accommodations,
such as higher joinder standards forcing non-practicing entities to adjust their
litigation strategies.54
Credibility, and ultimately, the usefulness of studies performed hinges on the
approach used by researchers; understanding the deficiencies allows work to progress
on more precise ways to illuminate the important details of the impact of intellectual
property policies. The traditional research methodologies examining the level of
innovation occurring in the economy originate from a long history of analysis
incorporating the examination of expenditures in research and development at
companies, as well as employment figures. Scholars have correlated this data with
patent issuances to extrapolate the level of inventiveness at a given time.55 Current
methods of study involve venture capital financing studies, public market studies,
and empirical studies with data collected from the USPTO. While helpful, these
methods may miss the finer microeconomic details and the importance of gathering
information from sources that are more difficult to obtain, such as independent
inventors.
A recent in-depth empirical study published by the SBA examines the impact
of the AIA on small businesses.56 The study employs three approaches: a public event
study, a venture capital financing study, and an evaluation of the Canadian switch.57
While the authors highlight many of the problems with investigating the impact of

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Jay M. Mattappally, Goliath Beats David: Undoing the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act’s Harmful
Effects on Small Businesses, 58 LOY. L. REV. 981, 1012 (2012).
Id. at 1020–25.
Jeff A. Ronspies, Does David Need a New Sling? Small Entities Face a Costly Barrier to Patent
Protection, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 184, 184 (2004).
Tagliente, supra note 9, at 314.
Filip De Corte, Tom Irving Tridico, Stacey D. Lewis & Gervas Christina N., AIA Post-Grant Review and
European Oppositions: Will They Work in Tandem, or Rather Pass Like Ships in the Night? 14 N.C. J.L.
TECH. 93, 135–36 (2012).
See Xun (Michael) Liu, Joinder Under the AIA: Shifting Non-Practicing Entity Patent Assertions Away
From Small Businesses, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 489, 489 (2012).
Dennis C. Mueller, Patents, Research and Development, and the Measurement of Inventive Activity, 15
J. INDUS. ECON. 26, 26–27 (1966).
JOSH LERNER, ANDREW SPEEN & ANN LEAMON, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS
ACT: A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF ITS IMPACT ON SMALL BUSINESSES 1 (2015).
Id. at 42–43.
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converting from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file system, the study leads to largely
inconclusive results.58
Other approaches to examining the impact of the AIA on small inventors
involve comparative studies with the recent Canadian transition from first-to-invent
to first-to-file in 1989. In one such study, it was found that the switch led to a skewing
of ownership of patents toward large corporations and away from independent and
small businesses. 59 Other scholars report that the change generally harmed
individual inventors.60 In reviewing the Canadian transition, using the number of
patent grants as a proxy for inventor size and applying a difference-in-differences
regression found that larger firms saw an increase in patenting activity relative to
smaller firms and suggest that larger firms received a greater benefit than did
smaller entities.61 More focused studies also seem to propagate the idea that small
inventors are harmed. The patent system “appears significantly stacked against
small entity participation.” 62 The level of harm is significant and the differences
between the well-funded and the under-resourced can be staggering, with evidence
that small entities are seven times more likely to have their petitions for inter partes
review denied than large entities.63 Arguments in favor of the AIA, however, include
discussion on how the new grace period protects small inventors.64 But there remains
a number of issues with the AIA, such as prior art searches becoming cost
prohibitive. 65 In addition to incurring numerous hefty expenses in the patenting
process, uncertainty of disclosures and multiple methods for challenging patentees
create costly problems for small inventors. 66 These burdens could easily price out
inventors that are unable to secure sufficient financing regardless of the AIA’s special
tools.
Though it appears that scholarly works in the literature lean toward a finding
that small inventors are largely harmed by the changes, some, citing a number of
technological advances and tools that have given inventors effective means for
commercializing their creations, suggest that the United States is experiencing a
golden age for inventors. 67 The Internet, for instance, has facilitated both ease of
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 119–20.
Shih-tse Lo & Dhanoos Sutthiphisal, Does It Matter Who Has the Right to Patent: First-To-Invent or
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access to markets as well as spread of knowledge and communication. Others argue
that the tools incorporated into the AIA will sufficiently protect small inventors.68
The pro bono program is one additional tool that the AIA has created to aid inventors,
but the question remains as to how useful these tools are—both technologically and
bureaucratically.
There is limited inquiry into the effectiveness of the patent pro bono program
itself. Previous attempts at establishing patent pro bono work encountered
difficulties at the intake, screening, and referral service stages. 69 Ongoing
coordination and creation of centers for pro bono work will aid in growth of the system
as well as collecting information related to the successes achieved, but because the
infancy of the program, the impact will not be well known for some time.70 Research
in this area has been constrained by a number of factors, but while alternative
approaches have been suggested, rigorous and specific collection of data is the best
method for determining the results of patent pro bono work.
There has been limited empirical research in the area of fairness and equality
in the patent system for a number of reasons. Part of the problem with research in
this area is the limitation on collecting aggregate economic data. The USPTO’s
system is not easily accessible to researchers. While there exists ways to peruse
patent data, such as the number of patents granted by geographic location, 71
obtaining income data for inventors for patents is much more time consuming.72 In
some cases, third-party data mining companies may be required. 73 Ultimately,
however, the AIA has had limited time to take effect, as it has not been around for
long enough for extensive sets of relevant data and data analysis to be performed.
Despite the AIA specifically requiring data collection and research for issues like
this,74 collecting broad sets of data for analysis remains problematic.
While finer granularity of data is preferred for examining if under-resourced
inventors are harmed, in some cases, the USPTO’s categorization of its inventors can
provide sufficient basis for at least some study. Data collected for a study conducted
by a former USPTO directory examining the advantage small entities retained over
larger patentees in a first-to-invent system employed the use of the USPTO’s four
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categories defining inventor size.75 The analysis led to the conclusion that first-toinvent systems granted no particular benefit to the small inventor.76
Experts studying this interdisciplinary area are few and far between. While
economists may develop models that examine inventiveness correlated with
inequality, they are less familiar and speak less often of the type of policy
considerations that the judiciary or Congress understand. 77 Conversely, legal
practitioners more familiar with the intricacies of the law, and the policies
underpinning statutory implementation often have limited exposure to complex
econometric
methodologies.
Examining
the impact
of
legal
changes
using comparative analysis methodologies such as difference-in-difference
frameworks may require joint participation from experts of different fields to fully
explore the breadth of the issues.
Researchers often set aside the difficult task of acquiring the best information
and settle for more comprehensive data sets for analysis. But to answer important
questions that will lead to better policy decisions, specific information must be
extracted from ongoing activity. Sources of information are varied and gathering
sufficient data from each category to glean insight present unique challenges. Notable
sources of data that could glean important trends include: examining the USPTO
defined inventor classes and their economic circumstances; looking at the volume of
patent pro bono prosecution work being conducted; querying attorneys in patent
litigation on demographic data and economic backgrounds of their clients, income and
wealth levels of participants in court cases, and other court documents identifying
the parties; surveying patent owners settling prior to disputes; acquiring data from
non-practicing entities or patent trolls; and contacting entrepreneurs and start-up
companies developing new technologies.
While data collection may provide significant insight, each source may contain
certain disadvantages or biases that could skew the perspective. For instance, the
problem with relying on venture capital activity or research and development
expenditures by public companies represents a limited basis for illuminating the
plight of the small inventor. Startups that are funded in this manner typically consist
of experienced or well-connected entrepreneurs. Smaller groups or individual
inventors are typically not well prepared to present their pitch to investors and face
many challenges in this arena. Information gathered from venture capital studies
may be of limited use in examining the status of small inventors. Careful
consideration of the source of data would need to be accounted for to isolate and
prevent introducing bias into the results.
Studying the impact of the provisions of the AIA is particularly difficult
because of the lack of historical data, as the AIA took effect in 2013. In general,
evaluating the effectiveness of the patent system has involved either conducting
studies that examine venture capital finance and public company behavior or
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analogizing macroeconomic data with other countries that have recently converted to
first-to-file systems. Researchers focus on these particular areas because of the
relative ease of access to relevant data and then analogize back to the present inquiry.
However, research on specific social and economic inequalities using this approach
presents a complex problem. “[T]aken as a whole, what comes out of a patent office is
at best representative of the technological potential of a given number of innovations,
but certainly not of their technological actuality.”78 The report outlined the flaws of
using patents as a means of extrapolating broader social implications.79 Others argue
that equating patents with innovation is flawed, and in the real world beyond the
ivory towers, the business world has moved away from its use, yet, in the legal and
social sciences community, the theory persists.80 Examining patent prosecution data
inherently excludes inventors that either could not afford the process or operated
under the assumption that their invention would be protected. While data regarding
litigation might present a viable source of information, many threats of suits will lead
uninformed and under-resourced inventors to settle. Extracting data from nonparticipating entities therefore remains a difficult proposition.
The traditional methodology employed may not present a clear path for
determining the level of harm to small inventors. For instance, although research
suggests greater innovation under a first-to-invent system, taken in consideration
with the assertion that small inventors do not receive any particular benefit in such
a system, the level of innovation in either system may be a moot point when
examining the inequalities created by the switch. Innovation may be a poor measure
of benefit from the patent pro bono program. The flaws in research are numerous, but
expanding our understanding of the impact of intellectual property policies is a
critical component to addressing an important factor contributing to economic
inequality and social justice.
III.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Encouraging innovation and invention among small inventors allows the
economy and society to reap the greatest gains. In order to enact effective laws to
achieve these goals, higher quality data is needed to help understand the current
circumstances and impact of policy decisions. A well-informed legislature will help
shape effective policy. Readily accessible sources of data include USPTO inventor
classifications, pro bono prosecutions from regional centers, attorneys involved in
patent litigation, court case and documents that provide sufficient information about
the parties, and venture capital financing activities. These sources of data center
around financial activity, patent prosecution, and patent litigation but do not provide
a complete picture and may be biased towards well-financed businesses and may not
be very representative of the problems related to inequality. To achieve sufficient
78
79
80

Pierre Desrochers, On the Abuse of Patents as Economic Indicators, 1 Q. J. AUSTRIAN ECON. 51, 52
(1998).
See generally id.
Jackie Hutter, We’re Measuring the Wrong Things: Inventiveness Patents Do Not Equal Innovation, IP
ASSET MAXIMIZER BLOG (October 31, 2010), http://ipassetmaximizerblog.com/were-measuring-thewrong-things-inventiveness-and-patents-do-not-equal-innovation/.

326

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[5:2

understanding of the social impact of the patent system requires collecting
information from small inventors that operate out of the garage and, though difficult
to locate, will provide highly valuable information. Additionally, requiring entities
involved in disputes to report settlement data will allow researchers to collect
aggregate data that is currently missing from analysis. Informed decisions by
legislators will produce less uncertainty for inventors, and use of comprehensive data
is a fundamental part of this process.
Beyond increasing the collection of data to determine the impact and causes
leading to inequalities as a result of the patent system, there remains the question of
how society should foster inventiveness for the under-resourced population. Although
some believe abolishing the patent system would be the better solution, 81 more
practical alternatives may provide real results. The AIA maintains a number of tools,
such as reduced fees and the patent pro bono program; however, additional methods
for increasing inventive activity from small inventors should be added to the arsenal.
Reducing fees to zero-cost or otherwise establishing a free-to-invent system for
qualified inventors may spur growth in this category of inventors.
A better informed community of inventors and patent attorneys will benefit
under-resourced inventors by allowing them to use the tools that have been provided
to them. In many cases, inventors may not be fully aware of the existence of or
cognizant of the special procedures and reduced costs that have been created for
them. The patent pro bono program will help in this regard, but attorneys need to
also be aware that an organized patent pro bono program is available. Improved
marketing of pro bono programs across the country will simultaneously serve the
community by helping inventors prosecute their patents but will also serve as a
marketing and educational platform for the patent system. Expanded use of the
services necessitates an increased awareness of the availability of the option.
Investment in research and development such as existing scientific grants for
academic studies is an important factor in encouraging innovation. 82 This is one
method for encouraging innovation among under-funded inventors. Governmentfinanced research initiatives typically involve grants to institutions, however,
investment grants for the small inventor is another viable avenue that would spur
innovation among entrepreneurial Americans that lack the necessary resources for
protecting their ideas. In addition, government funding can be targeted for certain
categories that see limited growth but may have substantial social benefits.
Government financing for research and development is critical for certain areas of
innovation.
A reduction in the length of time patent protection lasts may reduce the drag
on innovation. Monopoly rights held on technology create a lag on advancement by
preventing new, creative ideas from improving social well-being and labor
productivity. Certain areas of technology, such as pharmaceuticals, are dependent on
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longer time-frames for patent protection. Other areas, such as computer
microprocessors, evolve so rapidly that prolonged patent protection can stifle its
natural evolution. Cutting the length of time for which protections are granted for
certain categories will significantly benefit new entrants into the market.
Reducing the amount of damages that can be recovered in intellectual property
disputes can also help to close the gap between the well-funded and the underresourced inventor. This change can have a multitude of benefits. For example, the
current system inherently attracts trolls. By reducing the possible profits trolls can
recover, fewer resources will be wasted on fighting these entities and lining their
pockets with settlement dollars. In addition, large organizations will be less
incentivized to pursue expensive litigation to settle infringement disputes but will
still engage in litigation in courts to obtain injunctions if there are significant
technologies to protect.83 In addition, reducing damages will lead to fewer intellectual
property infringement cases and will subsequently reduce the incentive for
companies to pursue the common practice of constructing large portfolios of patents
as a defensive measure.
Instituting a free or reduced-fee licensing system for qualified inventors would
encourage development and marketing of technologies. Cross-licensing of
technologies would be increased under such a policy. Reducing barriers to entry for
newly-formed, cash-strapped entrepreneurs will encourage investment into new
ventures. These new ventures will in turn employ labor and lead to further economic
growth.
There are a variety of ways to improve the current deficiencies with the current
intellectual property regime. Conducting additional research into the nature of the
problem is a critical starting point. But other measures to encourage invention by
independent inventors and entrepreneurs will help to close the gap between the wellfunded and the under-resourced. From government funded research projects to more
patent pro bono work, these tools may have significant impact if inventors are able to
locate and take advantage of these resources. Other policy measures can be
implemented as well. All of these resources can significantly improve the problems of
economic inequality.
CONCLUSION
Maintaining conformity with the rest of the world in the interest of
harmonization while simultaneously preserving protections for individual inventors
and other underfunded creators is a challenging balancing act. With increasing
globalization and wealth inequality, corporate intellectual property strategies add
significant pressure for the poor, under-resourced, or otherwise disadvantaged
innovators. Protecting this class of inventors and encouraging innovation at the
microeconomic scale is essential to protecting American ingenuity and
entrepreneurial activity, as well as broadening the scope of benefits that comes with
technological innovation. Despite the problems associated with researching the
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issues, it is critical to the economy and to social development that the inquiry is
pressed forward so that the heroic American inventor can continue the dream.

